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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2503rd MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 15 December 1983, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Max VAN DER STOEL (Netherlands).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2503)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/16192)

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT: As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for this month I should like at the very outset to pay a tribute to Mr. Victor Gauci, representative of Malta, for the great diplomatic skill and unfailing courtesy with which he guided the work of the Council during the month of November. In performing his task he once again gave proof of his outstanding abilities.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/16192)

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: I should like to recall that in the course of consultations Council members agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Nail Atalay in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Atalay in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

4. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 30 November 1983 [*S/16192 and Add.1*]. Members also have a draft resolution [*S/16217*] which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 544 (1983)].

5. Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): Mr. President, I have great pleasure in availing myself of this opportunity first of all to extend to you our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December. During the past two weeks you have given the Council admirable leadership and excellent advice. We feel confident that your great experience as a diplomat and statesman and the prestige you bring to the presidency as a former Foreign Minister of your own country will enable the Security Council to fulfil its responsibilities and carry out its tasks during this month with great success.

6. I also with to express our sincere appreciation of the outstanding manner in which Mr. Gauci of Malta conducted the business of the Council last month.

7. I have asked to speak in order to offer an explanation of our vote on the draft resolution just adopted as resolution 544 (1983).

8. Throughout the informal consultations on this subject under your presidency, Sir, my delegation's main concern was to promote consensus in the Council on a draft resolution which, by ensuring maximum cooperation by the parties concerned, would facilitate the effective functioning of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and strengthen

the hand of the Secretary-General in the pursuit of his good offices to bring about a political settlement of the Cyprus issue. To this end my delegation had occasion to make certain observations, particularly on the preambular part of the draft resolution, which underlined the need for further amendments to it in consultation with the parties concerned so as to secure their broad agreement on this procedural yet important resolution.

9. Regrettably, in the draft resolution put to the vote, the third and fourth preambular paragraphs, which were objected to by the Turkish Cypriot representative, remained unaltered, whereas the second preambular paragraph was modified to indicate that the draft resolution lacked the concurrence of the parties concerned. For the first time, therefore, the Council has adopted a draft resolution on UNFICYP which does not enjoy the agreement of all the parties concerned. This is not because any of the parties entertains reservations in respect of the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP, but because the resolution contains certain elements which are unacceptable to one of the parties.

10. During the informal consultations my delegation had also suggested deletion of a reference to "other relevant resolutions" in the fourth preambular paragraph because this implicitly includes resolution 541 (1983), on which we had cast a negative vote and which was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community. Such a reference would further alienate the Turkish Cypriot community and prejudice the functioning of UNFICYP.

11. The draft resolution suffered from yet another flaw. Unlike those in the past it made no reference to the intercommunal talks and the important agreement which had been reached on the Cyprus issue within and outside the United Nations framework. In November, when the Cyprus issue was considered by the Council [*2497th to 2500th meetings*], Pakistan objected to resolution 541 (1983) precisely for the reason that it departed from the position of consistent support and encouragement to the intercommunal talks which the Council had maintained over the years. Omission of any reference to the intercommunal talks and continued reference to other relevant resolutions in the fourth preambular paragraph, therefore, did not make the draft resolution fully satisfactory from our point of view.

12. What was required was a simple procedural resolution. The controversial elements could have been easily dispensed with. It is a matter of regret that this was not done and that the draft resolution which emerged as a result of our consultations contained elements which had no direct bearing on the question of extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.

13. We have nevertheless cast an affirmative vote for the draft resolution to underscore the importance we attach to the United Nations peace-keeping role and to the usefulness of the continued presence of the United Nations forces in Cyprus in facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It is our hope that the parties concerned will continue to co-operate with UNFICYP.

14. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

15. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): It is an honour and a pleasure for me to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Council for the month of December and to express to you my Government's deep appreciation for the outstanding competence, efficiency and tact with which you have conducted the consultations for the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP. Your vast diplomatic experience and statesmanship assure a positive outcome to the consideration of the item before the Council. It is a source of satisfaction for us to see as President of the Council the representative of the Netherlands, a country with which my country enjoys friendly and close relations.

16. Our congratulations go also to your predecessor, Mr. Victor Gauci of Malta, a friendly neighbouring country in the Mediterranean with which we share common aspirations and destiny. The impeccable manner with which he carried out his high tasks as President of the Security Council during the month of November, when members were considering the attempted dismemberment of my country by Turkey, honours his country and himself.

17. In the course of human history there are glowing moments of progress but also striking hours of regression. One such hour of regression occurred in my country during the last six-month mandate of UNFICYP. Turkey, in contemptuous disregard of the Charter, the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly, attempted on 15 November, in Ian Smith fashion, to finalize the aggression committed against Cyprus on 20 July 1974 through the so-called declaration of independence of the areas of the Republic under Turkish military occupation.

18. This heinous crime aiming at the dismemberment of Cyprus shocked world public opinion and brought justified condemnation of the Turkish action by all States and many international organizations. The declaration of an independent Turkish Cypriot State is a new and more sinister act of aggression manifestly directed against the territorial integrity, unity and independence of Cyprus for the purpose of partitioning the island and destroying its identity and historic existence through the ages. A public statement on behalf of the Secretary-General said the following:

> "The Secretary-General deeply regrets the announcement of a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. He considers that this move is contrary to the resolutions of the Security Council on Cyprus and at variance with the high-level agreements of 1977

and 1979. It is bound to affect adversely the situation in Cyprus and to complicate the efforts of the Secretary-General to promote an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem under the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council."

19. In a message to the Fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Dhaka from 6 to 11 December, the Secretary-General underlined that "This announcement has inevitably increased tension in the island and set back the United Nations efforts to bring about an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem."

20. The illegality of this declaration is obvious. The so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a bogus and illegal entity, the outgrowth of aggression, set up by Turkey as its puppet in the occupied area. Legally, morally and politically this entity has no territory of its own except the areas controlled by the Turkish occupation troops, the latter having genocidally uprooted the whole indigenous Greek Cypriot population constituting 80 per cent of the population in the area and having implanted settlers from the mainland of Turkey in the homes and lands of those expelled. This fictitious entity which Turkey is promoting is, I repeat, the offspring of aggression and usurpation of the Greek Cypriot properties and the outcome of a continuing criminality against my country and people. Its true significance is a sinister attempt by Turkey to render permanent the genocidal expulsion of the Greek Cypriots of the occupied area and definitively to rob them of their ancestral homes and country in an unabashed manner that cannot and should not be tolerated in a civilized world society in the United Nations era. It is therefore inconceivable that any Member State of the United Nations would be willing to suffer the indignity of recognizing such a State created by unparalleled international crimes.

21. The Government of Turkey, which is deservedly taking its place among the most regressive régimes of the world, proceeded, during the six-month period under review, with a series of illegalities culminating in the attempted secession designed to dismember my country, to dissect what was created as one and indivisible and to incorporate part of it into the mainland of Turkey. That Turkey's final aim has all along been expansionist and the annexation of part of Cyprus is now made abundantly clear, even to those who were non-believers.

22. The Turkish Prime-Minister-elect, Mr. Ozal, in his latest statement unequivocally and bluntly put forward Turkey's expansionist designs in Cyprus. The statements that Cyprus is a "dagger stuck in the belly of Turkey" and that "Cyprus, lying only 40 miles from Turkey's southern coast, is particularly important for the nation's security" and that "if controlled by a hostile force it can be extremely dangerous" demonstrate the designs of Turkey against an independent State Member of the United Nations and completes the picture of a country which openly claims lands and territories from other States.

23. Such statements, said the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, not only run counter to every concept of international law and violate all its rules, but also expose Turkish propaganda, which always invoked the pretext of protecting Turkish Cypriots when all along the real aim was to undermine the statehood of Cyprus and partition the island.

24. The pretext of protecting the Turkish Cypriots has now been abandoned. Turkey's leaders themselves admit, by their cynical statements, that their policy is motivated by expansionism and not by the promotion of the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community.

25. It is very heartening, however, that humanity seems to have realized the true designs and real aims of Turkey. This is clearly reflected in the universal condemnation of the latest manifestation of Turkish expansionism.

26. This condemnation must, however, take practical form so that the aim of reversing the illegal attempt at the secession of part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus may be achieved and an end may be put to Turkey's annexationist designs, which are tantamount to the abolition of international law and order and are a real threat to peace and security in the area.

27. Turkey's frivolous argument that the secessionist move came freely from the Turkish Cypriots living in the north received the international contempt which it deserved. For it was Turkey, in line with its separatist, divisive and segregationist policy, which conceived, instigated and carried out this abominable act against the territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. It was Turkey which pulled the strings of the puppet régime of Mr. Denktaş; and the latter, in absolute response to the dictates of his masters, acted in full conformity with his doctrines of bantustanization.

28. Furthermore, the Turkish argument that the Turkish Cypriot community in the area can exercise the right to self-determination, is doubly fallacious. First, it is a distortion of this lofty principle, embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which is to be exercised by a people as a whole and not on the basis of factional, religious, communal or ethnic criteria. Secondly, the reality is that they cannot exercise such a right on a part of the territory of Cyprus, on which they have all along been but a small minority, while the large majority—80 per cent—has, as already explained, been genocidally expelled and supplanted, through the force of arms, by Turks from Anatolia and by the Turkish military occupying forces.

29. The Turkish argument that in Cyprus there are two peoples is an untenable and unacceptable position. In Cyprus, as in so many other countries, there

are people of more than one ethnic background. Some are of Greek ethnic background and others of Turkish ethnic background; there are still others of Armenian, Maronite and Latin background, all forming a precious and inseparable part of one people in one, undivided country. The present forced separation of our people carried out by Turkish bayonets is not a reality; it is artificial. But even if one assumes that the Turkish Cypriot community of 120,000 persons, which was forced by the occupier to reside in the north, is a separate people and that it can exercise separately that right to self-determination—which is not the case—this community is at present as much under occupation and foreign domination as the rest of our people, the 35,000 Turkish troops, the 50,000 Turkish settlers brought in from Turkey and the continuing yoke of occupation are not the necessary prerequisites for the free exercise of the will of the Turkish Cypriot community.

30. As a result of this illegal action taken by Turkey, the Security Council, by its resolution 541 (1983), of 18 November, deplored in unequivocal terms the declaration of the purported secession of a part of the Republic of Cyprus to establish the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and considered it legally invalid. The Council also called on all States to refrain from recognizing this fictitious entity and, more importantly, demanded the withdrawal of the declaration and the urgent and effective implementation of Council resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975). The resolution, in addition, requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress toward a just and lasting settlement of the problem.

31. In another international forum, the heads of State or Government of the Commonwealth Countries condemned the declaration issued on 15 November to create a secessionist State in the area under foreign occupation. Fully endorsing Security Council resolution 541 (1983), they denounced the declaration as legally invalid and reiterated the call for its non-recognition and immediate withdrawal. They further called upon all States not to facilitate or in any way assist the illegal secessionist entity. They regarded this illegal act as a challenge to the international community and demanded the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. The Commonwealth heads of Government pledged their renewed support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, and, in this respect, they expressed their solidarity with their colleague the President of Cyprus. Furthermore, they agreed to establish a special Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus, at high level, consisting of Australia, Guyana, India, Nigeria and Zambia, to assist in securing compliance with Council resolution 541 (1983).

32. Another international forum, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, deplored the declaration, considered it legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. Furthermore it declared that it continues to regard the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which is represented in the Committee of Ministers, as the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus.

33. Turkey, the perpetrator of the conspiracy and the only country which recognized that illegitimate entity in order to further its long-standing plans to incorporate it into the mainland of Turkey, has, as it has always done, contemptuously disregarded the mandatory provisions of resolution 541 (1983) and all other expressions of world public opinion to the effect that it should withdraw all recognition.

34. The primary task, therefore, of the Security Council and of the Secretary-General is to force Turkey to take all the necessary steps to vacate this illegal declaration, which is aimed at the dismemberment of one of the Members of the United Nations. Very correctly, the spokesman of the Secretary-General said on 25 November, "It is now necessary to work both for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its aspects and for the defusing of tensions in this critical area".

35. The Council, therefore, must give fresh thought to its historic mission and decide what practical steps and measures should be taken to reverse and neutralize this illegal act and to make Turkey comply with the Council's decision. The purported secession is illegal, immoral and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, to international law, to the resolutions of this body, to the international treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus and to the Helsinki Final Act, article IV of which states that: "No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal." The Council must stand firmly in defence of the unity and territorial integrity of States by doing everything within its power to uphold in practice the rule of law and the principles enshrined in the Charter and enunciated in its resolutions on the question of Cyprus.

36. Odious as acts of aggression may be, they are, unfortunately, not infrequent, and the resilience of mankind in the face of invasions and occupations has been displayed in all its breadth and strength. This is the first time within decades that an act aimed at the dismemberment of a State Member of the United Nations has been perpetrated. Therefore I hope to be judged leniently if I state solemnly that we, all the Members of the United Nations, are faced with a grave challenge: are we to be the States which did not do enough to neutralize this illegal act?

37. Mere condemnation of this heinous act will not suffice. What is needed is decisive, practical steps, restoring the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The Security Council should also consider practical steps against Turkey, which challenges the provisions of the Charter, contemptuously disregards the Council's decisions and thus tarnishes even further United Nations credibility and effectiveness.

38. Turkey, like South Africa, has since 1974, when the act of aggression was perpetrated against my country, been following a policy of contemptuous disregard of the mandatory decisions of this body. It continues and escalates the illegalities with the aim of further consolidating the results of its aggression and occupation of almost 40 per cent of the territory of my country and blatantly violates the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our people. Can it be denied that as of now not a single refugee has been allowed to return to his home and land, that not an inch of occupied territory has been vacated in compliance with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), made mandatory when endorsed by the Council's resolution 365 (1974)? And can it be denied that not a single missing person has yet been accounted for and not even a single file on the hundreds of missing Cypriots has been investigated?

39. Consequently the Security Council has no choice but to consider itself warranted in taking those measures provided for in the Charter to ensure the withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops and Turkish settlers from Cyprus, the withdrawal of the declaration and the rescinding of the Turkish recognition of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The usefulness and prestige of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security are at stake. Lofty principles of the Charter are being violated by Turkey, and the situation cries out for remedial action by the Council.

40. Bearing in mind those thoughts and appeals to the Council, my Government has agreed to the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP for another period of six months. In spite of its limited mandate, which was again so sadly demonstrated during the last escalation of the continuing aggression against the Republic of Cyprus, we believe that UNFICYP's presence is indispensable and that it has played a positive and constructive role in the island in maintaining peace and security, which are the *sine qua non* of a peaceful settlement.

41. In this regard and in view of the humanitarian role UNFICYP is playing, we express our deep appreciation to the countries contributing in the form of funds and men, to Major-General Greindl and to the officers and members of UNFICYP for their dedicated service to the cause of the United Nations and of peace in Cyprus.

42. I should like now to refer briefly to some parts of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus [*S/16192*] dated 1 December 1983, and particularly to paragraphs 51, 52 and 53, relating to his personal involvement and initiative in accordance with General Assembly resolution 37/253, of 13 May 1983. A careful reading of these paragraphs, although they are couched in diplomatic language, indicates that the response of my Government to his soundings, as handed to the Secretary-General by the President on 30 September, was positive and constructive and was described as such by the Secretary-General himself.

43. First, we responded within the time-frame set by the Secretary-General. Secondly, our response was in writing, and it is a matter of record. Thirdly, we accepted the personal involvement and initiative of the Secretary-General. Fourthly, we accepted his methodology of devising indicators. Fifthly, we submitted, again in writing, our specific observations, suggestions and comments to the indicators, as he requested when my President met with him on 14 September. The Secretary-General himself has described our response, both publicly, through an official statement of his spokesman, and privately, as "a positive and constructive step".

44. The Turkish attitude, on the other hand, was from the very day of the adoption of resolution 37/253 a negative one. First, they rejected outright the initiative of the Secretary-General. They demonstrated this rejection by postponing their meeting with him until after 30 September, the deadline set for the Turkish response, so as to demonstrate that they met him outside the framework of his initiative. Secondly, they did not submit a written response. Thirdly, they rejected the methodology devised by the Secretary-General. Fourthly, they submitted no suggestions or comments to the indicators, as he requested. In fact, we know that Mr. Denktaş, in his meeting with the Secretary-General, angrily rejected any notion suggesting activation of this approach and flatly refused to present written comments on the Secretary-General's three indicators.

45. With regard to paragraphs 54 and 55, on the subject of the possibility of a high-level meeting between my President and Mr. Denktaş, which was worked upon by the Secretary-General, the good faith of the Government of Cyprus was again amply demonstrated. Also revealed is the hypocrisy of the Turkish side and of Mr. Denktaş, who requested the meeting himself.

46. Our appreciation of and faith in the office of the Secretary-General are for us a matter of principle from which we can never waver. The United Nations and the Secretary-General are the cornerstones of our foreign policy upon which we have since independence placed our faith for a better world and for a just solution of our problem. We have consistently and constructively worked for the strengthening of the Organization and for the full exercise of the authority, functions or mandate of the Secretary-General, as provided in the Charter. Our diplomatic missions abroad need no special instructions to support what strengthens the sphere of activities and enhances the prestige of the United Nations. And that is the case with the high office of its chief administrator, to whom we extend our assurance of full and constructive co-operation in his initiative and personal involvement. We also express to him personally the appreciation of the Government and the people of Cyprus.

47. Our appreciation is extended also to the Secretary-General's able colleagues, Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Sherry, Mr. Holger and Mr. Picco. It was with

pleasure that we learnt of the high appointment of Mr. Gobbi in the Government of his country, Argentina. At the same time, we are equally pleased that he has agreed to continue his valuable services to the Secretary-General.

48. Little Cyprus, whether bleeding or temporarily mutilated, whether assisted or alone, will survive this ignominious act of aggression and continue through its history as one people and one undivided and free country.

49. We reiterate our feelings of friendship and common destiny to our Turkish Cypriot compatriots. We shall spare no efforts and fear no obstacles until we succeed, with the help of this respected body, in freeing our common country from the yoke of occupation by Turkey and reunite our people now separated by force of arms in a free, territorially integral and united Cyprus.

50. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I call.

51. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for acceding to my request to participate in this debate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

52. Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. In your person we pay a tribute both to a distinguished European statesman and experienced diplomat and to the country which you represent. I should also like on this occasion to congratulate the representative of Malta, Mr. Gauci, for the skilful manner in which he guided the Council's work last month.

53. The renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP since it was established has been based on a proposal by the Secretary-General, endorsed by the Security Council, and on the subsequent consent of the Government of Cyprus, which alone expresses the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over all its territory.

54. The Government of Greece, as in the past, concurred in the proposal of the Secretary-General for the renewal of the Force's mandate for another six months. But it did so deeply disturbed by, and fully conscious of, the dangers entailed by the presence of 30,000 Turkish occupation troops on Cypriot territory. Despite the earnest and natural desire of the Government of Cyprus to contribute to a just and lasting solution based on democratic principles accepted world-wide, the Turkish side not only has not responded positively but has exacerbated the situation by the purported proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot pseudo-State.

55. In view of those developments, the Security Council, in its resolution 541 (1983) adopted on 18 November, deplored that action, and in paragraph 2 considered it legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. It is obvious that that paragraph contains the main thrust of that highly important resolution. Moreover, in paragraph 4 of the same resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. Consequently, resolution 541 (1983) thus becomes one of primary importance with regard to the Cyprus question as a whole. As is natural, it is therefore directly related to the present resolution, which reaffirms the provisions of resolution 186 (1964), of 4 March 1964, and other relevant resolutions.

56. My Government wishes to state that it maintains the hope that the Secretary-General, with the support of the Council and the General Assembly, will be able to contribute to the implementation of paragraph 2 of resolution 541 (1983), so that favourable conditions can be created in the search for a solution to this protracted international dispute.

57. In the context of this analysis of the situation, my Government welcomes the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate with particular satisfaction, because a highly explosive situation endangering peace in the area might be created at any moment in a republic whose considerably smaller forces are confronted, on its own territory, by 30,000 Turkish troops. The danger for peace becomes greater if one takes into account numerous factors emanating from the historical background of the Republic of Cyprus and its location in an area which is already overcharged with the risks of war. That is why the presence of UNFICYP, with its great prestige, is an element which contributes to averting dangerous crises. It is a true peace-keeping force. It might also help create an atmosphere of moderation and confidence.

58. In conclusion, I should like to express our appreciation to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they are discharging the important mission entrusted to them. Particular thanks go to Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which contribute contingents, as well as to those countries which are helping with financial contributions.

59. I should like also in this context to express the appreciation of my Government for the continued interest and involvement of the Secretary-General and his staff in the effort to promote conditions conducive to a just, democratic and viable solution to the problem of Cyprus, the epicentre of which remains the withdrawal of the Turkish troops of occupation from the Republic of Cyprus.

60. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Nail Atalay, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of

procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

61. Mr. ATALAY: I thank you, Mr. President and, through you, the other members of the Council for giving me this opportunity to participate in the debate on behalf of the Turkish people of Cyprus, an equal co-founder partner in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus established in 1960.

62. I am sure the Council will recall what I said six months ago, on 15 June [*2453rd meeting*], during the deliberations of this body on this very subject but, by way of refreshing members' memories, I should like to quote from my speech that day. I then said:

> "The Turkish people of Cyprus and its Government have been doing and will continue to do their utmost in order to bring about ... a solution. However, in spite of the repeated assertions by the Greek Cypriot leadership that sovereignty in Cyprus belongs exclusively to them, the Turkish Cypriot people must also assert that, in reality, the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus can be the outcome only of an equal partnership between the two communities. And I must warn all concerned that every time the Greek Cypriot people rejects this partnership by word or by deed, each time it violates the inalienable rights and status of the Turkish people of Cyprus, my community will, as a last resort, consider itself at liberty, and even duty-bound, to do everything possible to defend its right of partnership and its inherent right to self-determination." [*Ibid., para. 121.*]

63. If, in the intervening period, the Greek Cypriot wing of the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus could continue without any legal, moral and practical justification, on any basis whatsoever, to represent the whole of Cyprus including the Turkish Cypriot people and areas, in which their writ has never run since the Greek Cypriot onslaught on the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963; and if the Greek Cypriot administration could claim to speak for the Turkish Cypriots and be allowed to consider them as being "non-existent" since December 1963; and if the United Nations organs chose to ignore the facts and the legal and political issues and implications involved; then it should be fully understood that the Turkish Cypriot wing of the bicommunal partnership Republic was left with no other alternative but to declare that it had nothing whatsoever to do with that entity which was wrongly recognized as the Government of Cyprus, that is to say, the racist Greek Cypriot administration. The Turkish Cypriot wing was and is entitled, in law as well as in fact, to assert its partnership rights, duties and responsibilities in the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, as recognized in the state of affairs created by the Cypriot Constitution and the international treaties in 1960, and to declare itself a separate State, while leaving the door open to establishing political links, in a federation, between the two wings of a bicommunal Republic of Cyprus.

64. It is for all those concerned to consider seriously whether pushing the Turkish Cypriot people to take such unavoidable steps in order to assert its treaty rights as a result of the one-sided decisions and conduct in support of the Greek Cypriot position alone will, in the long run, be conducive to finding a peaceful, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

65. A well-known Greek Cypriot author, Zenon Stavrinides, in his book *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood*, published by Louis Stavrinides Press, Nicosia, quotes from the humorist George Mikes as follows: "The Cypriots know that they cannot become a world power; but they have succeeded in becoming a world nuisance, which is almost as good."

66. Why are the Cypriots singled out for this notoriety? The same author on pages 62 and 63 in his book sheds light on this humorous observation. He says:

> "From the beginnings of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement, the Greeks spoke of Cyprus as 'their island', and claimed that she belongs to the glorious Greek people and that the existence of the Turkish community is a regrettable aberration of history. The Turks could point to many statements made by Greek leaders even during the 'partnership' years, which implied that the Turkish presence mars the purity of the Greek island. For example, Makarios himself said on 4 October 1962, that is, while he was head of the bicommunal State, in a speech at his home village, Panayia:
>
> " 'Until this small Turkish community that forms part of the Turkish race and has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty to the heroes of EOKA cannot be considered as terminated.'
>
> "In response to such Greek attitudes, Turkish nationalism asserts the dignity of the Turkish community and the rights and values of the Turks of Cyprus. This sentiment has been expressed in 1973 by my President, Mr. Denktaş, in his Rotary Club address as follows:
>
> " 'We are part of Cyprus. You can't throw us out. So accommodate us. Let's accommodate ourselves. We don't want to be "not wanted". That is the difficulty. For years we have been told by words and by action that we are not wanted in Cyprus, that Cyprus is not ours. And that makes any community very angry, and makes any community entitled, at least in their own conscience, to take all steps in order to prove that a land where they have lived for centuries is theirs and they intend to keep it as such.' "

67. The Turkish Cypriots' struggle then can only be understood as a necessary effort to resist the absorption of the Turkish Cypriot people by a Greek State or a Greek-dominated Cypriot State. I continue from the same book, page 61:

"To understand the nature of the official Turkish Cypriot nationalist position after 1963, it is necessary to see what the Turkish leaders had learned . . . from their years of 'partnership' and their study of the Akritas Plan"—this plan is the extermination plan of the Greeks, how to exterminate the Turks of Cyprus—"First of all it is impossible to resist the conclusion that Makarios and the other Greek leaders never honestly intended to co-operate with the Turkish leaders under a bicommunal type of constitution, let alone be satisfied with a mere 13 amendments of the 1960 Constitution. As the Akritas Plan makes it clear, the demand for 'reasonable' amendments would be only the first step of reducing the Turkish community to the status of a mere minority unable to effectively control the will of the Greek Cypriot majority. Once this was achieved, and the Treaty of Guarantee nullified, there would be nothing stopping the Greek leadership from appealing to the principles of self-determination, which means, in the context of Cyprus, that a monolithic majority of Greeks can decide for a monolithic minority of Turks too, and proclaim *enosis*. Further . . . the Greeks believed that the objective of *enosis* justified, if necessary, the use of violent means".

These are not my words. I have quoted these words from a book written by a Greek Cypriot.

68. For 20 years, one fourth of the island's population, the Turkish Cypriots, were politically, socially, economically and physically oppressed by their Greek Cypriot co-founder partners and neighbours. The leaders of the Greek Cypriot community and of Greece personally encouraged and conducted this oppression both in thought and in action. As far back as 4 September 1962, the late Archbishop Makarios is on record as saying what I have already quoted above, but I will nevertheless read it once again: "Unless this small community, forming a part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism, is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated."

69. During the same year, 1962, one of Makarios' ministers, Mr. Yorchajis, went even further than his master, to say, "There is no place in Cyprus for anyone who is not Greek, does not think Greek and who does not constantly feel Greek."

70. With such concepts and sentiments in mind, thousands of Turks were uprooted from their villages; hundreds were rounded up by Greek hordes and taken to as yet undisclosed destinations. Many were discovered buried in common graves and ditches, and many were forced out of Cyprus, out of their centuries-old homes and country. As to those who remained, they lived for 12 years in utter poverty and in most primitive conditions, while their Greek neighbours grabbed all that Cyprus could provide for its population. Above all, the Turks were constantly harassed and wantonly killed whenever an opportunity made itself available.

71. After a long and arduous struggle of no less than two decades against this Greek Cypriot aggression and tyranny, at great sacrifice and cost in lives, and as a result of the events initiated by the Greek *coup* of July 1974, the Turkish Cypriot people for the first time in years have been able to live in peace and security.

72. It is futile for Mr. Moushoutas and the Greek representative to try to present Turkey as an invader and appeal to international organizations for remedy to the prevailing situation.

73. As a lawyer himself, Mr. Moushoutas must know the tenet of the law which says, "He who comes to equity must come with clean hands". Yet, had he taken a glance at the bloodstained record of his administration, so appropriately portrayed in the following quotation, he would have seen that the hands of his leaders are far from clean. This is a quotation from *Le Canard enchaîné*, Paris, 19 February 1964:

"Last Saturday he, Makarios, was seen receiving journalists and laughing his head off for a full minute. That day the corpses of massacred Turks were piled up at the other side of the island . . . He will arrive with his hands pure. And yet all the perfumes of Cyprus . . . yes, yes, all the perfumes of Cyprus, will never clean those hands."

This is, as I said, a quotation from a French newspaper.

74. If Mr. Moushoutas and his leaders have any conscience, they should ask the forgiveness of the Turkish Cypriot people, as well as of their own people, instead of continuing with profuse dissemination of anti-Turkish propaganda for their ignoble purpose of distorting the facts to deceive world public opinion, and reinforcing and justifying untenable posture in Cyprus.

75. Alas, Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders, even at this late hour, have not recanted and are showing no signs of repentance for their abominable and unspeakable crimes in Cyprus which turned the island into a "lost paradise". Even at this late hour, they do not appear to concede one iota from their age-old, anachronistic ideal of *enosis*, which cost so much in terms of innocent human lives, resulted in horrifying mass graves and, on the whole, brought Cyprus to the edge of a precipice on so many occasions, and for so long.

76. To elucidate my point, I would like now to refer to the message of the Greek Premier, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, to his nation on the forty-third anniversary of the *Ohi* Day, on 28 October 1983—this was in *ANA*, the official bulletin of Greece—and, in particular, to the slanderous remarks about Cyprus contained therein, which constitute the latest demonstration of hypocrisy that has come to characterize the Greek policy on Cyprus. In the message, Mr. Papandreou had the audacity to refer to Cyprus as "part of the Greek national area", and in so doing he signalled the continuation of the

inhuman and racist policies emanating from the archaic goals and principles of the centuries-old Greek *Megali Idea*, which envisaged the resurrection not only of the Byzantine Empire, but also that of the empire of Alexander the Great.

77. As members are well aware, the *enosis* movement in Cyprus is a natural extension and an obvious outcome of this *Megali Idea* and, as such, still constitutes the main impediment to the finding of an overall peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

78. Since 1 April 1955, when the *enosis* movement was actively launched in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots, under the command and with the encouragement and support of Greece, have executed vicious armed attacks on whomever they considered to be an obstacle to the achievement of their racist, inhuman and expansionist aims, in total disregard of the lives and rights of the Turkish people of Cyprus. Those armed onslaughts have since 1955 caused great misery and loss of life in Cyprus—all in the name of *enosis*. An excerpt from a speech given by the then Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. George Papandreou, at the University of Salonica on 27 October 1964 will help prove the point:

> "All Greek Cypriots are for *enosis*. Cyprus must become the spring-board for the dreams of Alexander the Great in the orient. Cyprus alone is a small island and cannot achieve such dreams, but united with Greece the Cypriot people will have the opportunity of performing its historic task in the Middle East."

79. Speaking on the same occasion 19 years later, it was George Papandreou's son, Andreas Papandreou, who sent an irresponsible message, which only goes to prove the continuation of the expansionist policies of the Greek *Megali Idea*. What is more regrettable is the fact that this latest message is only one in a series of such aggressive statements which are revealing manifestations of a train of thought which shows no sign of abandonment. Furthermore, in line with the context and spirit of the message of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to his nation, the Pan-Hellenic EOKA Fighters' Association, in commemorating the same occasion, *Ohi* Day, has declared its opposition not only to the principles and framework agreed upon in the 1977 and 1979 summit meetings but also to the process of intercommunal talks in general aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. Moreover, that organization has boldly called on Greece to redeploy its armed forces in Cyprus, thus in effect envisaging a return to the tragic years of 1963 to 1974, when the road to *enosis* seemed so open and clear.

80. That is hardly surprising to us, for such organizations have as their mentor the Greek Prime Minister himself who, as reported on 23 November by the Greek daily *Ta Nea*, has at last let the cat out of the bag by publicly declaring what we rightly suspected all along: that he had never accepted federation or confederation as a solution to the Cyprus problem and that he was against dialogue of any kind with any party, putting a host of other unacceptable preconditions as obstacles to a fruitful dialogue between the two national communities in Cyprus.

81. It must be noted here that for reasons known only to himself Mr. Papandreou felt the need to include confederation amongst the solutions unacceptable to him. May I stress here again that a confederal solution has never been on our official agenda; we have never made any proposal to this effect nor approached anybody with confederation in mind. Mr. Papandreou may have mentioned confederation because he lacks a good grip on the subject, or he may be indulging in pure polemics. We do not know. But what is important about his latest *démarche* is the fact that he is rejecting a federal solution to the conflict.

82. I shall now attempt to contrast Mr. Papandreou's rejection of a federal solution with the very clear relevant provisions of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and with the Secretary-General's announcement made immediately after the 1977 summit. These are the facts.

83. The first guideline of the Denktaş-Makarios agreement of 12 February 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] reads as follows: "We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic." Furthermore, point 2 of the Denktaş-Kyprianou agreement of 19 May 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*], endorsed the Denktaş-Makarios guidelines as the basis for the talks. And, lastly, I draw the Council's attention to United Nations Press Release SG/T/752 of 17 February 1977, from which I quote verbatim:

> "Asked whether the term 'bi-communal' introduced a major change as against 'cantonal' or 'bizonal', the Secretary-General recalled that President Makarios had used the term 'bi-communal'. The Secretary-General thought that what was meant was a bi-zonal federal constitution. He added it was also agreed that the country should be non-aligned."

84. Those are the facts, and Andreas Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, does not want federation.

85. It seems evident to us that the Prime Minister of Greece is categorically rejecting the principles and decisions embodied in the agreements reached between the two national communities in Cyprus, agreements which have obviously been approved, supported and adopted by successive Secretaries-General and by the Security Council.

86. On the other hand, if we take a cursory look at the latest pronouncements, announcements and declarations on the Cyprus issue made by both the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government, we see that the sameness of opinions and concurrence of views is pointedly emphasized by all of them.

87. Can we not, then, reach the conclusion that the Greek Cypriots, too, reject the above-mentioned cardinal principles and agreements which are to form the very foundations of a solution? I shall now ask them officially here: do they accept these principles of the 1977 and 1979 agreements, the Secretary-General's own opening statement of 9 August 1980 [*S/14100, annex*] and the November 1981 "evaluation" document of the Secretary-General? I hope they will answer my question affirmatively.

88. Furthermore, Mr. Papandreou's aversion to a serious dialogue did not escape the critical appraisal of Mr. Averof, the opposition leader, who so rightly pointed out that

> "Mr. Papandreou was not only being inconsistent but could not muster the courage to terminate the intercommunal talks, to which he was strongly opposed, because those talks were supported by the countries of the West and the East and the non-aligned. What Mr. Papandreou really wanted was to make Cyprus an international issue."

89. There is a wide concurrence in the view that internationalization of the problem of Cyprus was Mr. Papandreou's hobby-horse. Such efforts received a shot in the arm with the advent to power of Mr. Papandreou, at the expense of a serious, result-oriented dialogue on the basis of the agreed framework—that is, the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, the opening statement and the "evaluation" document.

90. The statement of Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the opposition leader, which appeared in the Greek Cypriot daily *Simerini* on 1 November 1983, is, in a nutshell, an accurate—albeit with some shortcomings—explanation of the Greek side's approach to the intercommunal negotiations. Mr. Clerides said:

> "We did not sit at the negotiating table with Turkish Cypriots to find a solution to the constitutional problem when we were in a stronger position, with 10,000 Greek soldiers on the island and Turkish Cypriots in enclaves, on 2 per cent of the island. Now in a weak position, after Greek soldiers had left Cyprus, we began negotiating."

91. Mr. Clerides should also have added that, even after the clandestine Greek army in Cyprus was withdrawn under pressure from Turkey and international opinion, the Greek side's commitment to the talks was more apparent than real. For them, and especially after the premiership of Mr. Papandreou, the talks have always been a cosmetic exercise in international forums. Despite the express provisions to the contrary in the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979, point 6—constructive intercommunal talks—has always played second-fiddle to the utmost internationalization of the conflict. And today, after 20 years, we are saddened to observe the Greek leaders echoing the same neo-colonialist sentiments as in the past. And this is remarkable—only a few days ago, on 1 December, we heard Mr. Papandreou referring to Mr. Kyprianou as the President of Hellenic Cyprus.

92. For the Greek leaders, Cypriot or mainlander, the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus was and still is destined to become, politically, a Greek island or, at worst, a unitary Greek Cypriot State in which the Turkish Cypriot birds no longer sing. And they seem to be under oath to go to any length, irrespective of the cost in human and material terms, to realize their anachronistic aspirations.

93. It is because of such regressive colonialist sentiments expressed by the Greek leaders and the neo-colonialist and expansionist policies pursued by them that we have arrived at our present position.

94. As far as the Turkish people of Cyprus are concerned, we are here before the Council to reiterate once again the sentiments expressed by the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus before this body on 17 and 18 November 1983 [*2498th and 2500th meetings*], which are contained also in the declaration of independence circulated in a United Nations document [*S/16148, annex*]: that we are ready to resume, in a result-oriented manner, the intercommunal talks with our Greek Cypriot counterparts in co-operation with the Secretary-General's mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council in its resolution 367 (1975) and on the basis of the already mutually agreed existing framework comprising the high-level agreements of February 1977 and May 1979, the Secretary-General's opening statement of 1980 and the "evaluation" document of 1981.

95. Our proposal for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two sides still stands. Our efforts contained in the peace package concerning the resettlement of Varosha and utilization of Nicosia International Airport [*see S/16159, annex*] are still on the table.

96. We are ready to enter into substantial negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side on the basis of equal partnership. We do not make any conditions, and we sincerely believe that the change in the name of an entity which to all intents and purposes was an independent entity in every respect should not be allowed to be used as an excuse by the Greek Cypriot side to run away from the talks, which are, as the whole world admits, the only viable medium for a final solution of the conflict.

97. On the question of missing persons, I am glad to be able to say this much. As far as the Turkish Cypriot side is concerned, there is no obstacle remaining in the way of the resumption of the investigatory work and deliberations of the autonomous tripartite Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. We were very pleased to be informed through the usual channels that the Greek Cypriot side had withdrawn its procedural precondition, which was preventing the commencement of the actual work of the committee.

98. The third member of the Committee, Mr. Pilloud, accompanied by the Turkish Cypriot representative, paid a courtesy visit to President Denktaş on 28 November and was duly informed of the wish of the Turkish Cypriot side that the Committee should commence its investigative work as soon as possible. The Turkish Cypriot side was then informed that the Greek Cypriot side was unable to give the final go-ahead and was waiting for the return of Mr. Kyprianou to the island to reach a political decision on the subject. Mr. Pilloud is at present waiting for the Greek Cypriot decision in order to return to the island and, it is to be hoped, to commence the work of the Committee.

99. As for the resolution, Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 is the unfortunate resolution in which Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Cypriot wing of the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus were accepted as the Government of Cyprus, while the Turkish Cypriot wing was ignored and referred to merely as "the Turkish Cypriot community". And it was that unrealistic resolution, which was contrary to the constitutional arrangements in Cyprus, which gave the green light to Greek armed elements to attack the Turkish Cypriots throughout Cyprus.

100. Turkish Cypriot resistance to the Greek Cypriot attacks and the refusal of the Turkish Cypriot community to bow to Makarios's illegitimate will were quite honourable and constitutionally sound. The Turkish Cypriots owed no allegiance to the Greek Cypriot wing of the bicommunal Government of Cyprus and were not under any constitutional, legal or moral obligation or requirement to be so bound and therefore did not intend to bow to brute force. Hence our plight for 11 years until 1974: 103 of our villages were destroyed; 30,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees; all constitutional rights were denied us; all Turkish Cypriot elements were ousted from the bicommunal administration; all budgetary payments, dues and grants were stopped; half of the Turkish Cypriot population was in need of aid; all Turkish Cypriots were treated as outlaws, were unlawfully arrested, killed or disappeared for good. And now the Security Council is again trying to impose on my people the illegal will of the Greek Cypriots.

101. No, we cannot accept and we shall not bow to the Greek Cypriots. We have not submitted to them for two decades, and we shall continue to reject the false pretence of the Greek Cypriot side to the effect, first, that the Greek Cypriots form the Cypriot nation and that they alone are the people of Cyprus; secondly, that they are and that they will continue to represent the legitimate Government of Cyprus; thirdly, that the Turkish Cypriots are an ethnic group or minority within the Cypriot nation and, fourthly, that the Turkish Cypriots have no right to self-determination as a people.

102. We must once and for all give up this make-believe and stop this unrealistic reference to a non-existent entity, the so-called Government of Cyprus. Exactly 20 years ago Archbishop Makarios, in order to achieve his dream of *enosis*, unleashed his secret armies to kill Turkish Cypriots. This killing, harassment and abduction continued for 11 years, until 20 July 1974.

103. Was UNFICYP effective in preventing the killing of the Turks by the Greek hordes? No. It has never been effective. The only effective element was the Turkish armed forces. At the last hour we were saved by Turkey's legitimate and timely intervention. Thank God—and thanks to our saviour the Turkish armed forces. Our protector is and will continue to be the guarantorship of Turkey until a final settlement is achieved. Without this guarantee the Greeks will need only 24 hours to slaughter us. Do you want this to take place in Cyprus? UNFICYP has been ineffective in preventing the murdering of Turkish Cypriots by the Greeks.

104. Some of you asked me whether or not our security would be in jeopardy if UNFICYP withdrew. My answer was "No". Our security, as I have already stated, has been and can only be effectively guaranteed by the Turkish armed forces for the time being. Therefore the withdrawal of UNFICYP will not affect the security of the Turkish Cypriot people. The past events have sadly demonstrated that neither the Security Council nor UNFICYP as a force is prepared to ensure my people's very existence, survival and liberty.

105. When for 11 years we were treated as second-class citizens by the Greeks we were advised to show patience. We have shown it for 20 years. We were told that we must not leave the negotiating table because the world would condemn us. It is not the Turkish Cypriots who have left the negotiating table and trotted to international forums for one-sided resolutions which, if applied, would mean the end of the Turkish Cypriots as co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus. We have not left the table, but we have been condemned all the same. We have not left the table, where we thought we were sitting as equals talking about the re-establishment of the partnership Republic, only to find out that the United Nations General Assembly has given the mandate to the Greek side to wipe us off the map of Cyprus, if need be with the help of the United Nations.

106. This time we had hoped that the Security Council would take this opportunity swiftly to fulfil two overriding aims of the moment: extend the mandate of UNFICYP and support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. We sincerely believed that it was in the interest of all for the Council to adopt a concise, clear-cut resolution attending to the immediate tasks before it without giving rise to an acrimonious debate. We also believed that the Council had precedents before it to follow—as it did on 29 November 1983, in resolution 543 (1983), in the case of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force—to avoid delving into the substance of the conflict, to avoid contentious issues and to keep an equidistance from both sides involved in the conflict.

107. With such reasons and aims in mind we proposed a simple, concise draft resolution which would address the immediate tasks before the Council, namely, the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP and the expression of support for the continuation, without further ado, of the Secretary-General's good offices mission entrusted to him by Council resolution 367 (1975).

108. We also sincerely believed we had the right to expect a more balanced approach from the Council in the light of the latest developments. On 15 November we appealed to the whole world to stop giving credence to the unconstitutional, illegal and illegitimate régime of the Greek Cypriots, which has been sailing under the fake banner of the Government of Cyprus. On that day the Turkish people of Cyprus voiced to the world its irretrievable objection to the perpetuation of the pretention to and the occupation of the seat of government by this unlawful racist régime of Greek Cypriots. This play-acting by the Greek Cypriot wing of the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus, which had gone on for 20 years and, to an extent, with the connivance of the world, had to be stopped.

109. The Turkish people of Cyprus have been appealing continuously to the world to act upon and correct the naked injustice done to it and thus terminate this unconstitutional state of affairs. For 20 years we have watched patiently the usurpers of central power in Cyprus masquerade as the legitimate Government of Cyprus before the eyes of the world while the political status of the Turkish Cypriot wing in the body politic of Cyprus was constantly eroded from that of a co-founder partner in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus to that of an inferior minority community or ethnic group destined to become the servile subjects of the Greek Cypriot masters in a Greek Cypriot republic.

110. The proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the manifestation of the right of the Turkish people of Cyprus to self-determination conjointly acquired by the two communities when Cyprus achieved independence. After all, it is axiomatic that in a country or a State like Cyprus, where no nation existed as such and where the State came to birth as a result of the mutually-consented-to partnership of the two national communities, irrespective of the population ratios and where exercise of the right to self-determination of one of the national communities, especially the way it manifested itself, would have resulted in the enslavement of the other, both national communities possess the right to self-determination.

111. Proclamation of independence by the Turkish people of Cyprus represents not only a resounding "no" to *enosis*, but also a categorical rejection of minority status and an unequivocal comment on the illegitimacy of the Government of Cyprus represented by the Greek Cypriot imposters.

112. For the last 20 years, as regards the resolutions extending the mandate of the UNFICYP, our approach has been quite consistent. We have been giving our consent to the resolutions extending the mandate of UNFICYP only after registering our strong reservations on the references to the so-called Government of Cyprus. Furthermore, we have always stressed the self-evident phenomenon that as long as the legitimacy and constitutionality of the Greek Cypriot administration posing as the Government of Cyprus was not called into question, it would not negotiate with the Turkish Cypriot side on an equal footing in a result-oriented manner, with a view to reaching a solution on the already agreed basis. The same grave mistake was also made in the Security Council's latest resolution, 541 (1983) of 18 November. This resolution was the last drop, convincing us that the present unconstitutional state of affairs is being favoured by the many at our expense.

113. I am saddened to say that the resolution before us does all this and more. I feel duty-bound, therefore, to spell out our reaction to this unrealistic resolution—not in so many words perhaps; suffice it to say that it is unacceptable to us. The Council has even decided, upon the insistence of the Greek Cypriot side, to delete from this resolution the paragraphs referring to the intercommunal talks which had appeared in the previous resolutions.

114. Therefore, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, for reasons enumerated in this statement, rejects this resolution *in toto*, and from today onwards the principle, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of the co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on the decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

115. As regards UNFICYP operations in Cyprus, our position has been quite consistent and clear. We have never been against the operations and mandate of UNFICYP in Cyprus, and we have had good working relations with UNFICYP. What has really been disturbing us recently is the behaviour and attitude displayed by some of the troop-contributing countries. We are of the opinion that the political posture adopted by troop-contributing countries in a given peace-keeping operation is of crucial importance to the effectiveness and smooth functioning of peace-keeping duties in the field. In those cases where the United Nations peace-keeping forces operate with the consent of the parties to the conflict, as is the case in Cyprus, it is doubly important that these operations be carried out impartially, unhindered and unburdened by the policy of the respective troop-contributing country as regards the political substance of the issue. Similarly, it is crucial, therefore, that the troop-contributing countries maintain a posture of impartiality and even-handedness in their approach to the parties involved and on the substance of the issue in question as a *sine qua non* of the effectiveness and success of the peace-keeping operation. Without the trust and confidence of the parties

involved, it is difficult to imagine peace-keeping forces operating effectively. The utmost care should be taken by all concerned not to impair the trust of one or the other of the consenting sides to the operation.

116. The behaviour and voting record of some of the countries contributing troops to UNFICYP on General Assembly resolution 37/253 and on Security Council resolution 541 (1983) have, I must stress, impaired our trust and confidence in UNFICYP's operations. The time-honoured tradition of maintaining impartiality on the political substance of the conflict was broken on those occasions by these Member States, including even some represented here. Although we do not in any way question the right of any country to exercise its sovereign right to vote the way it deems fit on any issue, we are trying to stress that peace-keeping is a noble objective, the fulfilment of which requires meticulous impartiality.

117. I should like to take this opportunity to convey to the Secretary-General our profound appreciation of and admiration for his unfaltering dedication to a just and durable solution of the Cyprus conflict. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would like to pay a tribute to the excellent diplomatic qualities and exemplary sense of justice and understanding displayed by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar in his long years of involvement with the Cyprus issue. We should like also to reiterate our complete trust and confidence in him and our wish to have him continue his mission of good offices, to which we hereby pledge our full and ungrudging co-operation.

118. Our warm appreciation and thanks go also to Mr. Hugo Gobbi, who, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, has demonstrated an exceptional ability to adopt a balanced and dextrous approach to the tasks at hand. His involvement with the Cyprus problem is total and sincere. We wish him all the success in the world in his present lofty task. We are happy to hear that he will be continuing as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus. Moreover, I should like to convey our sincere thanks to all the members of the Secretariat dealing with the question of Cyprus.

119. I shall not bother to answer the preposterous humbug of the representative of the racist régime, because it is an exact repetition of the speech made by that régime a month ago, and it was totally refuted at that time by my President. I shall be positive and constructive and shall not answer his allegations. Although I have an extra five pages about his accusations on the subject of occupation, I will not read them to the Council. I request you, Mr. President, to instruct the Secretariat that these five pages be included in the *Official Records of the Security Council* [*see S/16232, annex*].

120. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

121. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey) *(interpretation from French)*: Mr. President, permit me at the outset to thank you sincerely. During the difficult consultations that you have conducted concerning today's resolution, you have shown exemplary impartiality and unfailing patience. I am grateful to you for this and shall not forget it. Allow me also to convey my compliments to Mr. Victor Gauci, representative of Malta, who guided the Council's work last month with exceptional diligence. I wish also to pay my respects to the Secretary-General and once again to assure him of my Government's complete confidence in him.

122. Resolution 544 (1983), which has just been adopted by the Council, has been rejected in its entirety by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In the view of my Government, that decision by the Turkish Cypriot Government is totally justified. Therefore, for my part, I must inform the Council of the Turkish Government's complete rejection of that resolution.

123. In rejecting in its entirety the resolution in question, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot Government a few moments ago made a statement on behalf of his Government that "from today onwards the principle, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on the decisions [*see para. 114 supra*] which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The Turkish Government supports that statement and confirms that contacts between the Turkish authorities in Cyprus and UNFICYP will henceforth be conducted on the basis of that Turkish Cypriot statement.

124. UNFICYP was dispatched to the island in 1964, following aggression by the Greek Cypriots against their Turkish compatriots. However, the deployment of that Force on the island did not have the expected result. From 1964 to July 1974, the date when the Turkish troops arrived on the island, the Turkish Cypriot community and its members continued to be subjected to the most severe harassment. Incidents of that type did not completely come to an end until the arrival of the peace force sent from Turkey. These are historical facts, irrefutably proved by the course of events. I should like to add that the Turkish armed forces will remain in the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, at the request of the Government of that Republic, until the attainment of a final solution recognizing and guaranteeing the rights and security of the Turkish community on the island.

125. Today UNFICYP is supervising the cease-fire zone and rendering certain humanitarian services. While the activities I have just mentioned are duly appreciated by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and by Turkey, we should not lose sight of the fact that the cease-fire will in any event be respected and that those humanitarian services will be rendered, since

that is the shared desire of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and of Turkey.

126. It remains a fact that the presence of that Force in Cyprus demonstrates the interest of the United Nations in Cyprus. The Force in this way fulfils a political function to which the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey are not, in principle, opposed. However, the way in which that eminently political interest is expressed and directed must be consistent with the basic principles of law and justice. That, unfortunately, is not the case.

127. How often must the representatives of Turkey and of the Turkish community of Cyprus be compelled to reiterate the following facts, which they have already had to explain on many occasions? These facts are that the Republic of Cyprus is a State created by international treaty; that a special treaty guaranteed the Basic Articles of the Cypriot Constitution; that one of those Basic Articles prohibits any amendment to those same Basic Articles; that the Treaty of Guarantee[1] not only is binding on Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom but also constitutes an integral part of that Cypriot Constitution; that the unamendable Basic Articles of that Constitution, ensuring the bicommunal nature of the State, were trampled underfoot by the Greek Cypriots and by Greece; that following the *coup d'état* in 1963 the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots were abolished and constantly violated; that the exclusively Greek Cypriot administration resulting from that *coup* cannot, either under constitutional law or under international law, legitimately and legally claim the title of Government of the Republic of Cyprus, since that State owes its existence to international treaties; and that respect for the supremacy of the rule of law and of the principle of the inviolability of international treaties should prevent third States, and in particular the guaranteeing Powers, from recognizing as a legal and legitimate Government an usurper administration which can only claim to represent its own community.

128. We shall never tire of repeating those truths. We shall firmly defend them as well as the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community, since we Turks have the means of defending them.

129. To those who, for reasons that are difficult to understand, persist in condoning a violation of law, we would say that their message can have no credibility whatsoever as far as the Turkish people and the Turkish Cypriot people are concerned. That is why I must affirm that the interest shown in the Cypriot problem by any international organ, as long as that organ continues to support and endorse usurpation, will leave the Turkish people sceptical, but it will exasperate the Turkish Cypriot people.

130. Thus it is in that context that UNFICYP's presence must be placed, a presence which bears testimony to the political interest of the United Nations in the question of Cyprus.

131. It is in that same context that we should understand the complete rejection of the resolution in question by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and by Turkey.

132. I have just spoken of scepticism and exasperation. Indeed, it is extremely difficult for the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish peoples to grasp the reasons for this disregard, this systematic flouting, of the most fundamental rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. There are indeed few cases in which law and justice are so clear from a simple process of deduction. There are few cases in which logic and morality are so perfectly in harmony. States, like persons, communicate according to logical processes. States, like persons, must behave in accordance with justice and morality, otherwise harmony is lost in inter-State society between conscious awareness and categorical imperative. How, then, is it possible to be surprised at the scepticism of the Turkish people and the exasperation of the Turkish Cypriot people, when international bodies refrain from heeding the principles of both logic and justice?

133. A striking example can be found in a particularly interesting paragraph of Security Council resolution 541 (1983). In that paragraph the Council makes a point of recalling the Treaty of Guarantee of 16 August 1960, twenty-three and a half years after its entry into force. That the Council should recall it is itself an event, an important and positive event. But the Council recalled it solely in order to attack the proclamation of independence by the Turkish Cypriot community. I am very grateful to the speaker who, during this debate, explained that that paragraph does not imply a denial of the existence of other cases of violation of that Treaty. It is quite true that the original sin was the Greek Cypriot *coup d'état* of 1963. That *coup*, which manifestly violated the Treaty of Guarantee, has never been criticized by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Furthermore, by recognizing the Greek Cypriot administration as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus those international organs have given absolution for original sin, and they are now condemning those that refuse to be sullied with that original sin.

134. The proclamation of Turkish Cypriot independence is only an act of retortion which draws its own legitimacy and legality from the illegitimacy and illegality of the unilateral destruction by the Greek Cypriots of the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus. That is all the more so since, in accordance with the general principles of law, that act of retortion has as its only goal the restoration of "the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution", as stipulated in the Treaty of Guarantee; and since in its proclamation of independence the Turkish Cypriot community has declared that its sole aim is to reach understanding with the Greek Cypriot community with a view to the regeneration and restructuring of the destroyed institutions of the Republic of Cyprus on a bicommunal, bizonal and federal basis, on a footing of equality.

135. I must say quite frankly that, when the Security Council recalls the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in order to deplore Turkish Cypriot independence and immediately relegates it to oblivion to honour the Greek Cypriot usurper, the destroyer of the bicommunal Republic, that attitude provokes smiles in Turkey and anger in the Turkish Cypriot community. As for those who traditionally do nothing but talk, we do not even hear their clamour.

136. However, in the hope that the simple truth will reappear and that everyone will understand that it is impossible through injustice to arrive at a lasting solution based on justice, let us now concentrate on the possibilities of a definitive settlement. In this regard, my Government considers it to be its duty to try to dispel certain illusions.

137. In certain circles it seems that some nourish the hope, however futile, that the Turkish Cypriot community might be persuaded to rescind its decision or, failing such a reversal, that Turkey might at least be persuaded to withdraw its recognition of the independent Turkish Cypriot State. Such hopes are not only contradicted by a simple political analysis of the elements surrounding the problem but also reveal complete ignorance of the psycho-social structure of Turkish society. We are still, fortunately, a society whose well-being lies in the preservation of its sense of honour. No one should venture to try to bring the Turkish nation to its knees.

138. In 1921—and this is a date full of memories for some—we struggled against adversity, and since then we have sworn never to suffer defeat. And for us dishonour is even worse than defeat. Those who hope for the impossible will have to wait until the end of time, if they have the patience.

139. But the Turkish Cypriot community, supported by Turkey, is open to understanding, negotiation and compromise. It sets no preconditions for negotiation, and no one should try to impose any on it.

140. Efforts must therefore be concentrated not on trying to humiliate the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey—they will not let themselves be humiliated—but only on bringing about a meeting at the same negotiating table of the two parties to the eternal dialogue on the island of Cyprus.

141. I will say one last thing. This resolution, adopted in spite of the legal precedent created by the Council itself in its resolution 543 (1983), of 29 November, is not, unfortunately, such as to reduce tension and facilitate understanding.

142. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Cyprus has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I call on him.

143. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): I am compelled to speak in exercise of my right of reply, even though the many allegations, distortions and outright falsehoods have been repeatedly and fully exposed in this forum during previous meetings of the Council every six months, and more recently during its meetings of 16 to 18 November [*2497th to 2500th meetings*]. As usual, I consider the statement made by my compatriot, Mr. Atalay, as made by the oppressor, the aggressor and by the usurper of our homes and lands. He who speaks through others speaks for himself.

144. First let me say that I consider it to be the epitome of audacity when the aggressor, Turkey, the usurper, the oppressor of our people, all our people —Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites, Latins—and the occupier of 40 per cent of our territory, contrary to repeated United Nations resolutions, accuses its victim of usurpation of power. To what usurpation is the Turkish representative referring? To the country? We are in Cyprus and we shall remain there because we belong there. It is the ancestral homeland for the Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and the Latin Cypriots. It is our country, little as it is, unfortunate as it is. It has been our country for centuries.

145. Turkey is the alien and undesirable element in Cyprus. Its presence in Cyprus, by Mr. Ozal's own admission, is for expansionist reasons and to safeguard —hear ye, hear ye—Turkish security! A small population of half a million is a threat to mighty Turkey—what a preposterous argument indeed!

146. We are here in the Council because we are the sole and legitimate Government of Cyprus, a democratic Government at that, duly elected. We are here because we are duly recognized by the whole world but, thankfully, not by the aggressor. Our Government and system is free, not a travesty of democracy, as it is in his case. We did not expel anyone, and of course not the Turkish Cypriot officials from the Government. The Turkish Cypriot ministers and other officials are not at present in the Government, not by our choice, but because of threats to their lives by the aggressor, so as to undermine the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. I repeat, they were not expelled; they were forced by Turkey to abandon the Government and they did so. As a matter of fact, we yearn and struggle for their return. As my President solemnly stated in the General Assembly in October, at the 15th meeting of the thirty-eighth session, they are welcome to return, and I dare the representative of Turkey to accept the 1960 Constitutional order.

147. The members of the Turkish Cypriot community were never and are not today considered by us as second-class citizens. Our sense of fairness and pride —in the good sense, not in the sense used by the representative of the aggressor—would not allow us to do so. I repeat here that the Turkish Cypriot community constitutes a precious and inseparable part of our people, and so they have been treated. When 18 per cent of

my country—that is, the Turkish Cypriot community—have had 30 per cent of the civil service posts, 40 per cent of the police and national guard positions, it takes much arrogance for anyone to speak of oppressed or unwanted people.

148. It is true that the Turkish Cypriot community suffered, but this was due to their leadership's divisive, partitionist, segregationist policies. We heard the reasons for their suffering from the representative of the aggressor. Members of the Council have a choice: on the one hand they have his version; on the other hand they have the highest independent authority, the sagacious Secretary-General, and I will quote again from his report of 1965, which I consider is a reply to silence these falsehoods:

> "The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents . . . The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots . . . the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file." [*S/6426, para. 106.*]

149. The Turkish representative spoke about *enosis*. It is no secret that the right of self-determination claimed by the Cypriots during the colonial years was aimed at *enosis*. The records of the General Assembly are here and cannot be disputed. But what about today? Now there is an independent, sovereign, non-aligned State, Member of the United Nations, which struggles to remain so in spite of Turkish acts of genocide against our people. Its House of Representatives declared on 20 September 1979 and on 2 October 1981:

> "its immovable aim to full independence and its rejection of any solution which would abolish this independence or would annex in any way the whole or part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus to any other State. It further stipulates its rejection of any partition or the declaration of any part of Cyprus as an independent State."

150. I have, I believe, covered the question of *enosis*. The question of attempted dismemberment and secession is a matter for the Turkish representative to explain.

151. As we have stated before, we have all along accepted the equality of our citizens. We accept that for every man there is a vote, that they are equal before the law, that they are entitled to equal treatment and equal opportunities; but we cannot accept numerical equality. We cannot agree that 18 per cent, the Turkish Cypriot community, equals 82 per cent, the Greek Cypriot community.

152. This type of numerical equality strikes at the roots of every democratic principle. In fact it creates inequality, which in turn strikes at the balance upon which the federal system should be based. The Turkish claims that there is agreement of two partners, peoples, which will form the federation and will live in their own areas under the administration of their own federated State is a distortion of the Makarios-Denktaş agreement of 1977. Furthermore, the statement in the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus that the talks are to be carried out "on an equal footing" indicates that the negotiations should be conducted freely without the handicapping of any side in the intercommunal dialogue and does not in any way predetermine or prescribe the nature of the solution, which must be based on the United Nations resolutions.

153. The Turkish representative referred to the intercommunal talks. A record of broken promises and reneging on solemn commitments undertaken has been the history of the intercommunal talks, which were held, not freely—as requested by the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions—but instead under the pressure of the occupation troops. By a series of *faits accomplis* and other illegalities carried out methodically while the talks were under way, Ankara sought to consolidate its military stranglehold over the occupied area and to complete its partitionist aims. While paying lip service to the talks, Turkey used them as a smokescreen and a shield to mislead and silence the international community, thereby gaining time to complete its insidious aims against the territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus.

154. "Why do you complain", Ankara would ask whenever confronted with *démarches* about its failure to comply with United Nations resolutions. "There are inter-communal talks under way. We have to wait to see their outcome before we withdraw our troops."

155. In the meantime, they saw to it, of course, that through delaying tactics and policies of diktat that the talks led nowhere. In other words, the talks were useful to Turkey as long as they went on interminably and conveyed some expression of hopeful results to the anxious international community and to the anguished victims of Turkish aggression. In this interminable process, the Government of Cyprus made painful concessions in its desire to break the impasse created by Ankara's dilatory tactics and its recalcitrant intransigence.

156. First, we were asked: "Why not be realistic? Never mind about the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, which specified that there must be, first, withdrawal of the occupation troops and cessation of the foreign interference in the Republic of Cyprus and then negotiations on the internal aspects of the problem. Make a gesture towards Turkey. Agree to negotiate and call the bluff of the Turks, who say they are ready to negotiate a solution along the lines of the resolutions of the General Assem-

bly and of the Security Council." We called the bluff of the Turks and agreed to negotiate without demanding, as we were justified in doing under the Charter, international law and the United Nations resolutions, the prior withdrawal of the forces of occupation. What happened next? The Turkish side came along with another demand, and a promise: the Cyprus Government must accept in advance that the solution of the constitutional aspect of the problem must be a federal one. If this is done, then, they promised, there will be rapid progress towards a solution and withdrawal of the Turkish troops.

157. When the Government of Cyprus heeded the advice and the strong pleas of the Secretary-General and of Governments in a position to influence Turkey, we were then—predictably, I must add—confronted with a set of further demands, coupled with an alluring assurance: if only the Cyprus Government accepted further that the agreed federal solution of the constitutional aspect will be implemented on a bi-regional basis as opposed to the multi-regional approach advocated by the Cyprus Government, then we would really be close to an agreement and to a pullout of the occupation troops.

158. There were again strong pleas and arguments put forward for a more unilateral concession, coupled with the assurances of quick progress for a just solution, given by those who were in a position to influence Ankara. The Cyprus Government, in its desire to see an end to the ordeal and to the daily trauma of our people, Greek and Turkish alike, once more heeded these pleas and agreed to call the bluff of the Turkish side one more time.

159. But, alas, once the Turkish side had cashed in on the new concession by the Government of Cyprus, as it had done earlier in the case of the August 1975 humanitarian agreement, it proceeded to create a new deadlock in the negotiations and defiantly demanded further concessions from the other side while making none of its own. This, then, is the sad history of the intercommunal talks. These talks were not free, as called for by the resolutions of this body; they were negotiations at gunpoint. I challenge the representative of Turkey to dare point to a single reciprocal step taken by his Government to comply with any of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), endorsed by resolution 365 (1974) of this body, a resolution for which, hypocritically, Turkey itself voted.

160. The Turkish side spoke about the law of estoppel. I am grateful to my fellow countryman for remembering that I studied law. The usurper of our land, the aggressor, one who uprooted our people from their homes and lands and brought settlers to change the demographic character of my country is estopped from claiming such defence; for, as he said, in accordance with the law of equity—and up to this point we agree—Turkey came to the fold not with clean hands; theirs are really bloody and genocidal, and this is an area in which they have excelled in exterminating peoples.

161. The Turkish side should have done a little more research on the book from which they quoted. This book is neither authoritative nor objective. The quotations it contains are motivated by political aims and have nothing to do with the truth. The specific quotation attributed to Archbishop Makarios is particularly false and malicious. Archbishop Makarios' stature is too great to be tarnished by cheap fabrications and falsehoods such as those the Turkish side regurgitated *ad nauseam*.

162. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Greece, in exercise of the right of reply.

163. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I admit my inability to follow the Turkish side's lengthy, monotonous and mainly out-of-context recital of newspaper articles, statements, speeches and obscure authors. They have been harping on these themes for years now. Replies have been given to them and they are on the record.

164. But I am compelled to invite the Council's attention to the last part of Mr. Kirca's intervention, which contained statements made in his characteristic style —pompous and provincial arrogance. We consider those statements as veiled threats to the peace of the south-eastern Mediterranean area. I invite members of the Council to read them very carefully, and I should like to assure them that, if Turkey and the Turkish people have a sense of honour—and at least the people of Greece have a sense of honour—and if those statements were to be implemented and those threats acted upon to the point of implementation, peace would be gravely disturbed in our area of the Mediterranean.

165. I should like also to draw the attention of certain Governments and authorities which, under the pretext of impartiality, have for years now been according the same treatment to the criminal and the victim, thus managing by this attitude of false impartiality to give the Turkish representative the audacity to come to the Council and launch veiled threats against my country. I think this highly respected international body should take very seriously into account the statements made in the last part of Mr. Kirca's intervention.

166. The PRESIDENT: There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

NOTE

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

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